Sunday, 10 June 2012
So that’s a Spanish bank bail out then. Lovely. Except it reminded me of this blog post written in 2009 (!) called “Are the Spanish banks hiding their losses?” What was/is so good about this post is how the author shows how one of the 2 big Spanish banks appeared to take an overly optimistic stance when it came to declaring losses on its US mortgage book, the implication being its “loss hiding culture” was probably company wide i.e. it applied to its Spanish operations as well.
Old news? Nope because this year it had become increasingly hard to reconcile the Spanish unemployment rate with the much lower rate of mortgages going bad that the Spanish banks were collectively willing to declare. Alongside this were other suspicions about how Spanish banks were artificially propping up house prices, again to minimise their losses. When confronted with this kind of stuff in April, the Santander CEO declared “Anyone raising this problem as one of the issues for the Spanish financial system is saying something stupid.”
There you are then. Except, alongside this you had Bankia restating its annual accounts for 2011 in a way that turned a Eur309m profit into a Eur4.3bn loss before taxes.
To be fair the Spanish government does finally appear to be aware of the credibility issue surrounding Spanish bank accounts, hence independent outsiders have been brought in to establish how much capital the Spanish banks need before the bail out gets doled out. Except, outsiders already audit Spanish banks so they can produce annual accounts; they’re called accountants.
So what makes this lot any different? Err, they’re management consultants as opposed to bankers or accountants, which is kinda confusing. Like are accountants no longer fit to audit banks, are current annual reporting requirements that inadequate, are Big 4 firm Spanish accountants bent? Am sure all of these things will be examined at length and in great detail.
Back in the real world, there are a couple of things to consider. One is the extent to which a blind eye appears to have been turned towards the general dodginess of Spanish bank accounting practices both at a Spanish and at an EU level. Practically, this left the Spanish government playing catch-up, placing sticking plasters here and there as new problems emerged. The consequent Spanish and EU failure to sit down and sort shit out once and for all led to a drip, drip dripping away of confidence and credibility that I’d guess means the bill now in the process of being paid is far bigger than it would have been say 2 years ago (compare/contrast with the last British government's approach of bank recapitalisations and the introduction of an Asset Protection scheme to draw a line under potential, future losses).
Another is how this modifies interpretations of the current situation that focus exclusively on government debt. Spain had a debt fuelled property bubble to be sure, but a private sector led one; the Spanish government was by comparison a global model of fiscal probity. So rather than debt, I reckon the main parallels to draw between Spain, Greece and Italy concern the significant contribution the behaviour of their political and economic elites made to their current woes, be it institutionalised Greek tax dodging, Italy’s general bentness or Spain’s overly optimistic bank accounts. Note how in every case these issues cut across both the public and the private sector. Note also, give or take Berlusconi being got rid of, how bail outs don’t directly address them i.e. the European debacle is going to continue for the foreseeable future with presumably Portugal and Italy next in line.